# Economische en Beleidsinzichten van Energietransitiestudies voor Nederland

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# Three energy problems

- Peak oil: oil production reaching a ceiling, which translates into steadily rising oil prices
  - correctly predicted for USA in 1970s (Hubbert)
  - predicted for World around 2010-20 (Hubbert, others).

→ Rise in global energy demand: Countries are improving their energy efficiency but since the ones with a relatively high energy intensity grow faster, world energy efficiency is not improving (*Simpson's paradox*). Relocation and international trade cause carbon leakage.

→ Global warming: long term social, economic, security and health risk.

# Peak in supply of conventional oil



Source: Wikipedia.

# Past and Hubbert model predictions of geographical composition of oil supply



Source: ASPO (2004).

# Combined demand and supply effects on the oil price



Source: http://www.euribor.com.

### Climate change: "Temperature hockeysticks"



Source: Chapman and Davis (2010)

#### Main solutions to these problems?

→ Peak oil as a solution to global warming?

Shift to coal and unconventional sources of oil (heavy crude oil, oil sands, and oil shale) which generate much more CO<sub>2</sub>

 $\rightarrow$  We have only three strategies to reduce CO<sub>2</sub>:

- Forestation limited options
- *Carbon capture & storage (CSS)* very limited experience, needs
  much R&D
- Less use of all fossil fuels (regulating their supply and/or demand)—
  linked to energy conservation and renewable energy

# Decoupling requirement is astonishing:

Factor 20-100 reduction in emission/energy intensity



Figure 17 Carbon Intensities Now and Required to Meet 450 ppm Target<sup>25</sup>

# How logical and easy is a transition to renewable energy?

- → Economically logical energy transitions: Food → Animal power & firewood
  → Carbon → Oil, gas, electricity
- Transition to renewable energy only logical from environmental but not economic angle
  - Low-EROI renewables compete with locked-in, high-EROI fossil fuels
  - Environmental innovations are *factor-saving* rather than *quality improving*
  - Diffuse public benefits, concentrated private costs

Two lessons:

 $\Rightarrow$  Large-scale diffusion of environmental innovations not through unregulated markets  $\Rightarrow$  EROI of renewable needs to be improved considerably – public and private R&D

# Energy return on (energy) investment – ERO(E)I

Indicator of physical cost of obtaining energy resources for economic use: net energy or energy surplus

"Renewable future": Many energy and labor inputs needed indirectly – *transition to renewables economically unlogical* 

Surplus energy in the past was basis for creating complex economy/society!



Source: Hall et al. (2009)

#### Transition strategies/policies: Avoid three "escape routes"

➔ Indirect and avoidable effects of well-intended strategies and policies: *undercut their effectiveness* 

→ Carbon leakage of unilateral policies: relocation of dirty industries and increase of dirty import flows

- happened with ETS aluminium, cement and paper industries, imports of energy-inefficient products from emerging economies (China)
- => International climate treaty essential

→ Green paradox due to market subsidies for renewable energy: subsidies interact with oil market - may increase CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

*Energy rebound:* esp. incomplete technical standards or voluntary action

# Energy rebound mechanisms

- More intensive use of efficient energy-consuming equipment  $\rightarrow$
- Purchase of larger units or units with more functions →
- Re-spending financial savings due to conservation  $\rightarrow$
- New, more energy-efficient devices embody much energy  $\rightarrow$
- Wide diffusion of more (energy-)efficient technologies ... etcetera **→**
- Examples and consequences: →
  - Steam engine Jevons paradox (> 100% rebound)
  - UK 2000: cost of lighting 1/3000 of 1800 value; same period income 15x. But so much more light use now: relative spending on light down only 50%.
  - Energy intensity defined as energy input per monetary output has dropped by >30 % since the 1970s – but total energy use has risen. 12

### Many reasons for environmental regulation by prices

- Price instruments equalize marginal abatement costs among polluters =>
   cost-effective which contributes to social/political acceptability
- 2. Subtle, complete control: all goods/services have prices in proportion to pollution generated over life-cycle *minimize rebound & green paradox*
- 3. Price represents permanent incentive for both *technology adoption and innovation* (environmental innovation trajectories are misguided if prices wrong)
- 4. Empirical evidence for price incentives strong econometric studies

→ *Distribution/equity concerns:* Block-pricing for basic needs, recycle tax revenues relatively much to poor (note: all strong regulation will redistribute)<sup>13</sup>

# But policy package needed

#### → Only carbon pricing – but early *lock-in*:

- Reinforces early lock-in of currently cost-effective technologies
- Learning potential of alternatives is neglected
- Incremental innovation more attractive than radical innovation
- => Technology-specific policies: "keep promising but expensive options open".

#### → Only technology support – but green Paradox:

- Subsidizing renewables stimulates accelerated extraction of fossil fuels
- Moreover, no carbon tax means net energy cost low, so energy demand up
- => "Supply policy" needed cap/price fossil fuel extraction, possibly using prices/standards/tradable permits (Sinn, 2008)

=>Innovation (policy) no substitute for environmental regulation

# Should the Netherlands do much more than other countries? → Pro:

- First-mover advantage (Denmark-wind, Germany-solar)
- Set an example for other countries.

→ Con:

- 1% country, slechts 4% hernieuwbare energie.
- Voluntary energy conservation leads to much rebound, and is thus ineffective.
- Serious, strict national regulation of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions means considerably higher costs of energy, stimulating relocation of polluters and trade flows => damage to Dutch economy + carbon leakage (emissions shift abroad, and imports and international freight transport will increase).
- → Effective alternative strategies? invest much in public R&D, subsidize private R&D, fight for an international climate agreement and EU policy, and fund information provision for "international consciousness"

# Energieakkoord 2013

- ➔ Toont geen tot weinig begrip van de mechanismen die ik hier heb besproken.
- ➔ Bijv. energiebesparing in de bouw via subsidies, dus nog veel meer rebound dan bij vrijwillige energiebesparing.
- Doelen onrealistisch gegeven historie en beleidsinzet (geen regulering/beprijzing)
- → Wordt er überhaupt over rebound gesproken in het akkoord? Heeft men beleid bedacht om rebound tegen te gaan?
- → 15000 banen is niet indrukwekkend en zijn dure, gesubsidieerde banen.

→ PBL, CPB en ECN niet positief.

#### Conclusions

- → No bottom-up without top-down regulation and incentives: Thus a post-Kyoto treaty essential – unilateral & voluntary policies ineffective
- Policy package: pricing CO<sub>2</sub> (tax revision), technological policy (subsidies), information provision ... regulating advertising.
- → Innovation returns channeled back to the public sector: *transition fund*.
- → If we tax CO<sub>2</sub> oil prices will not go up to the same extent as we will indirectly tax oil producers (OPEC).
- → Patience needed, but difficult with threat of dangerous climate change:
  - Decades of high expenditures on R&D and technological diversity transition in 2050
  - Avoid large renewables market with quickly outdated technology -R&D vs. market support

Wetenschappelijk tijdschrift gespecialiseerd in de onderhavige thematiek

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